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Botnet Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are now 20 years old; what has changed in that time?
Their disruptive presence, their volume, distribution across the globe, and the relative ease of launching
them have all been trending in favor of attackers. Our increases in network capacity and our architectural
design principles are making our online world richer, but are favoring attackers at least as much as Internet
services. The DDoS mitigation techniques have been evolving but they are losing ground to the increasing
sophistication and diversification of the attacks that have moved from the network to the application level,
and we are operationally falling behind attackers. It is time to ask fundamental questions: are there core
design issues in our network architecture that fundamentally enable DDoS attacks? How can our network
infrastructure be enhanced to address the principles that enable the DDoS problem? How can we incentivize
the development and deployment of the necessary changes? In this article, we want to sound an alarm and
issue a call to action to the research community. We propose that basic research and principled analyses are
badly needed, because the status quo does not paint a pretty picture for the future.
CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy→ Denial-of-service attacks; Security protocols.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: DDoS, scrubbing, mitigation, volumetric, reflection
1 INTRODUCTION
What has happened in the last 20 years:
In 1999, a set of compromised computers, called Trin00 [13], took down a network at the University
of Minnesota; and with this first documented case, botnet volumetric Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks were undeniably born. While earlier attacks against infrastructure exist in anec-
dotes and recollections, it is with this documented case that we can archivally establish the lower
bound of 20 years. Many changes, enhancements, and evolutions to our mitigation technologies
have happened since then, but are we demonstrably better off today (now 20 years later)? Trin00
used hundreds (and actually may have been composed of thousands) of compromised machines
(“bots”). Today, conventional bot-network (“botnet”) sizes have been seen in the millions. By to-
day’s standards, Trin00 may not sound like a large botnet. However, size is not all that matters.
In some cases, smaller (well-provisioned) botnets have hit harder than any before (e.g. the Mirai
botnet attacks [5]). Attacks like those from Mirai illustrate that the size of a botnet is not the sole
determining factor in the damage it can do. Another, perhaps archival, lesson is that historical
attack sizes are relative, and raw numbers alone don’t tell the tale. Moore’s law and bandwidth
increases make comparing attack volumes (bits-per-second, bps) from the past to today an apples
to oranges comparison. Gigabit attacks in 2000 were considered staggering, but only because they
rivaled provisioned capacity of services and carriers of the time. An unfortunate state of affairs
is (and has been for the last 20 years) that it is easier to gain attack capacity (i.e. compromised
hosts and aggregate attack bandwidth) than it is to gain defensive capacity. Moreover, during the
last 20 years, our remediation strategies have not fundamentally evolved as attacks have been
swelling in size and complexity. The state-of-the art in the DDoS defense industry still centralizes
our defenses (in “scrubbing” centers) against growing distributed attacks. In short, what was true
then is still true now: DDoS is an asymmetric threat with impedance mismatch between attackers
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and defenders, which strongly indicates the need to reexamine the principles that underlie the
problem-space.
Victims of our architecture’s success:
Internet protocols have long been designed to abstract decisions and operations away from each
other to foster heterogeneity, scalability, encapsulated functions, and more. At the same time,
DDoS attacks have evolved to using Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs) at and above
the network layers (at the application-level). This has, as a consequence of our layered abstraction
model, hidden DDoS semantics from the transport and network layers. As defenders against DDoS
attacks, our fundamental challenge is the onus to tear apart attack traffic from legitimate traffic,
where the distinction is often only visible at the application layer, and conventionally encrypted
there. A recent operational report of large-scale measurements stated “SSL [sic] is majority of traf-
fic in [North America] by 2019” [27]. The necessary computational complexity, the volume of traf-
fic, and the growing use of encryption often render common operational network tools ineffective
in defending against attacks. What’s more, some operational observations infer that the deploy-
ment of necessary security protections has been limited “Where there is no clear early adopter
advantage” [22].
In facing the distributed threat of DDoS, our distributed network should be our greatest coun-
termeasure, but how without application-level inspection of traffic? For example, how should a
network-level management tool determine which of a stream of DNS queries are real and which
are participating in a reflector attack [20]? Or, which NTP command is legitimate and which is
part of an attack [15]? Or, is a memcached query from a real application or part of an attack [7]? Or,
which HTTP client is trying to keep a needed connection alive and which is starving the server
for resources [34]. Today, it is hard for either the network-layer or the transport-layer to mount an
effective defense because they do not have policy semantics that can encode diverse application-
level nuances. DDoS mitigation is necessarily done using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and, there-
fore, only after centralizing distributed attack traffic. This impedance mismatch, distributed attack
versus centralized mitigation, is further complicated when application payloads are “embedded”
(e.g. encrypted) and require multiple layers of complicated and expensive “decoding.” For exam-
ple, performing DPI on an HTTPS flow requires decryption of the flow, but that requires escrow
of the end-site’s TLS private key (to terminate and inspect the embedded flow). Internet proto-
col layering, coupled with the end-to-end principle, has made it difficult to shut down the DDoS
floodgate because bad traffic cannot easily be filtered out at the network layer alone. In short, we
have been losing the DDoS war, and it is time to ask why and investigate the fundamentals of this
problem-space.
In this article, we want to sound an alarm that we must take corrective action. We posit that the
research community is ideally suited to formulate and investigate fundamental questions about
how we got here. For example, are there foundational issues in our network architecture that fun-
damentally enable DDoS attacks? How can our network infrastructure be enhanced to address the
principles that enable the DDoS problem? In order to reap the gains of our work, how can we in-
centivize the development and deployment of necessary changes? To move our defensive posture
forward we need to take a fresh look at the problem and consider fresh approaches.
This article is structured as follows: to illustrate how dire our situation is, we provide a brief
background, then propose a few ways to categorize the “state of the union” of DDoS attacks: archi-
tecturally, volumetrically, and economically. We then take a closer look at the fundamental nature
and state of DDoS attacks, today. From there, we discuss modern mitigation techniques in the
DDoS defense industry (e.g. “scrubbing”), before concluding with a discussion.
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2 DDOS BACKGROUND
There is not one type of DDoS, there are a variety. Some are called “low-and-slow,” which starve
servers of resources, and can be hard to detect. Some are volumetric, which send overwhelming
amounts of traffic that congest network links and overload servers and are hard to stop even
though they are detectable by nature. There is a large body of literature that broadly proposes
DDoS taxonomies [6, 23, 32]. Much of the prior work has included more than just DDoS attacks,
themselves, but also categorized malcode ecosystem aspects like implementation details, malcode
behavioral differences, the infection vectors, and also the attack TTPs involved in DDoS attacks.
In order to highlight the status of our war on DDoS, we focus on addressing operational aspects of
DDoS attacks: their natures, their traffic, and detecting and remediating them. Of the many types
of DDoS attacks and TTPs, we briefly describe a couple common generalized examples: volumetric
and resource starvation.1
2.1 Volumetric DDoS, today
Large volumes of DDoS attack traffic (sometimes called “packet love”), generally require service
providers to invest in very expensive infrastructure and network bandwidth (capacity). In volu-
metric DDoS, the largest recorded DDoS attacks have all been stateless and have capitalized on
the ability to spoof (or “lie about”) the source addresses of their attack traffic. As just a couple
of examples: in 2016, the first publicity around a terabit attack came from an attack on krebson-
line.com [25]) and it was able to reach this volume through its use of source address spoofing in
a reflector attack. Not long after that in 2016, a larger attack on Dyn [30] surpassed this volume,
again using source address spoofing. In short, the TTPs of the largest DDoS attacks seen today
rely heavily on being able to spoof addresses (even if that is just to leverage an online service for
an amplification factor).
While this is not a new type of DDoS, the increasingly relative ease of acquiring the disrup-
tive power of large volume attack sources has elevated the appeal of stateless DDoS attacks to
adversaries. Spoofed datagrams may be Domain Name System (DNS) queries, Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) queries, Network Time Protocol (NTP) queries, memcached queries,
or others. Some stateless attacks may also be spoofed control traffic for TCP connections (not re-
flected traffic). For example, TCP SYN packets that have spoofed source addresses and large data
payloads [42] (even though SYN packets are not permitted to carry data on setup [39]).
2.2 Resource Exhaustion Aacks
While many headlines focus on the largest DDoS attacks seen, and in recent years, those have
all tended to be stateless, there continue to be many instances of attacks that leverage protocol
aspects in the Secure Socket Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS), or even at the HTTP
layer (which might be using HTTPS). These attacks can be crippling without a DDoS defense
system, but they do not result in headlines as often as their volumetric counterparts. While these
attacks don’t approach the volumetric scale of reflector attacks, resource exhaustion attacks allow
attackers to bring Internet services down with far fewer resources.
Perhaps the earliest known resource exhaustion attacks were those that abused the Transmis-
sion Control Protocol (TCP), itself: SYN-flood attacks. Reported evidence [10] suggested that these
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks did not appear to be distributed, but this nevertheless illustrates
that this type of attack has been used in the wild since at least 1996 [12]. Attacks like these (which
1This is not meant to be presented as a comprehensive list, a taxonomy, or to undercut the importance of other types of
DDoS, or even to suggest our observations are limited to these.
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used source spoofing andmay ormay not be distributed) were initially intended to exhaust servers’
resources, and were neither volumetric, nor stealthy (low-and-slow).2
One of the early examples of low-and-slow attackswas an attack called Slowloris [21] in which a
relatively small number of stateful HTTP queries would hold connections open on webservers and
thereby exhaust their ability to answer other (legitimate) clients. Other exhaustion attacks exploit
TLS’ cryptographic key negotiation [11]. In these types of attacks, the raw numbers of attacking
clients and traffic are not as spectacular as volumetric DDoS, but (perhaps more troubling) is the
fact that their detection and remediation more clearly requires additional state information above
the network layer.
2.3 Detection vs. Remediation:
An important distinction in the DDoS war is the difference between detection and remediation. The
techniques to detect a DDoS often are very different than remediating it. Moreover, detection and
remediation are not always addressed in the same places in the network, or even by the same
service provider. One common mode of operation is for an online service to detect that it is under
DDoS attack (of some kind), and to then engage a DDoS mitigation provider. We discuss this in
more detail in Section 4, after we first discuss the DDoS State of the Union.
3 STATE OF THE UNION
Assessment: are we winning, or losing? There are many ways one could evaluate the state of
the union with respect to DDoS. Here, we use three example perspectives to categorize ways in
which our status could be evaluated: (1) architectural (2) volumetric (3) economic. These are not
meant to be the canonical set, a complete set, or to be a formal framework. Rather, these are simply
used to help illustrate aspects of the DDoS defense ecosystem.
3.1 Architectural State of the Union
Technologically, not much has fundamentally changed for defenders, but a lot has changed for
the attackers. Our reliance on DPI for detecting and remediating attack traffic has resulted in in-
creasing dependence on keeping our defenses in centralized approaches (relative to DDoS sources).
For example, with reflector attacks leveraging application-level semantics, and the increased use
of Transport Layer Security (TLS), terminating and interpreting traffic has necessitated backhaul-
ing traffic to DPI, or “scrubbing,” centers. There, the tools used by defenders have incrementally
evolved, but the fundamentals of our approaches have not. What’s more, this has framed an archi-
tectural asymmetry: large volumes of attack traffic (more sources with increasingly better provi-
sioned networks) vs. central remediation. This is particularlyworrisome in the face of the increased
complexity of web applications and their increased use of encryption. These often demand that a
remediation engine act as an end-point in a network flow. The architecture of today’s DDoS mit-
igation techniques is centered around machines (or network appliances) that inspect traffic, both
generally and at the application-level. As a result, our mitigation techniques are predicated on
matching mitigation bandwidth to ever-growing aggregate distributed attack volumes, and that is
(at best) a band-aid solution. This observation has echoed if different ways, and in different places
for some time. For example, in 2015, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
announced a call for Extreme DDoS Defense (XD3) that included a solicitation to “[disperse] cyber
assets (physically and/or logically)” [16].
2Though, we note that many recent attack TTPs incorporate this technique in distributed attacks (DDoS).
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Some existing operational attempts towards dispersing network-based remediation, such as
BGP’s FlowSpec [31], Remote Triggered Back-Holing (RTBH) [26], etc. attempt to coordinate dis-
tributed defenses by pushing remediation information to the network-layer. However, without
the necessary application-level expressiveness, this can unfortunately lead to collateral damage to
well-behaving sources contained within the same network prefix as attackers, non-attack traffic
that is sourced from compromised devices, etc., and has arguably limited the appeal and adoption
of these protocols and techniques.
3.2 Volumetric State of the Union
Considering the volumetric state of the union (volumes of attack traffic vs. carriers/providers pro-
visioned capacities) paints a similarly disconcerting picture. Service Providers (SPs) buy transit in
Gigabit per second links (Gbps) in multiple locations from multiple carriers. Internet eXchange
Points (IXPs) and carrier capacity are also often offered in Gbps. Large carriers’ global aggregate
capacity may approach (and in some cases achieves) Terabits per second (Tbps), but this does not
mean any given ingress point to a carrier’s network is (itself) a Tbps link. Generally, aggregate ca-
pacity in Tbps is summation of router/regional capacities (Gbps). Consider, even routers’ linecards
only reach 100 Gbps, but aggregate attack traffic of the largest DDoS attacks is already over 1 Tbps.
In an aggregate view, a recent observation from operational measurements quotes that “attacks
[are] growing in size faster than network growth.” [27]
Moreover, the aggregate capacity matters far less than if this capacity exists near all attack
sources. Often, it is all but guaranteed that aggregate capacity is not near attack sources, and it
can often be topologically very far from attack sources. “The InternetâĂŹs capacity attenuates
the total throw weight a DDoS attack can generate; the farther a target is from components of a
network, the less traffic that will make it across any congested links between the target and the
attack source” [3]. This can (and often does) result in service degradation and outages to other
Internet services, whose traffic shares congested routing infrastructure (i.e. collateral damage).
When attack sources are topologically far frommitigation, their traffic is backhauled across tran-
sit and peering infrastructure to scrubbing centers. This has the effect of centralizing distributed
attack traffic for mitigation, and draws terabits of attack traffic to (in some cases) gigabit scrubbing
centers. Even in the case of high-capacity scrubbing centers, the current state of affairs is that a
distributed attack is necessarily remediated in a (relatively) more centralized mitigation infrastruc-
ture.
The largest DDoS attacks that we have seen are already larger than the provisioned capacity
of many (if not most) of the large providers and carriers’ capacities. In 2016, the US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) started a program called DDoS Defense (DDoSD), whose starting
position was, “one day” DDoS could swell to 1 Tbps [17]. By 2017, the largest DDoS attacks had
already reached that, and in 2018 DDoS attacks quantifiably exceeded that.
3.3 Economic State of the Union
Using money as a canary-in-the-coalmine, service providers’ outlay to protect against DDoS also
paints a grim picture. In 2000, DDoS attacks on Yahoo, eBay, and several other major Internet
services led the news and raised alarms. Now, almost 20 years later, protection rackets exist in
gaming spheres. Online gaming and gambling sites are frequently held hostage for ransom by
DDoS threats [29], and sometimes attacks are launched simply in order to gain gaming advan-
tages [37]. More generally, today, all online services need DDoS protection, and companies expect
to pay for for defensive protections against inevitable DDoS attacks. The DDoS mitigation market
was $1.94 billion in 2018, and is growing [40]. What’s more, there has also been a DDoS-for-hire
(i.e. “booter”) grey-market for roughly a decade [38, 43]!
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Internet services need protection, but there is no official remedy to DDoS. So we must pay for
help. In a sense, we have privatized our police force (i.e. the DDoS mitigation marketplace).
4 DDOS SCRUBBING
Detecting an attack (versus other abnormal, but benign, traffic) can be critical, especially if a ser-
vice provider intends to use a DDoS mitigation service to remediate attacks. Under “peace-time”
conditions, services are often provisioned to handle expected load and user behavior, periodic
above-average “bursts” of traffic, slow TLS handshakes, and other suboptimal client behaviors.
Once an attack is detected, the subsequent remediation is very often done by applying application-
level semantics to packets and/or packet flows. These semantics allow remediation to inspect and
“scrub” attack traffic off of legitimate traffic.
4.1 Why scrubbing
After DDoS traffic is “scrubbed” away, the remaining (“good”) traffic is then delivered to appli-
cations. Scrubbing uses techniques that range from measuring traffic heuristics to any number
of vendor-specific techniques that assess the veracity of traffic and approaches that address both
stateless and stateful attack TTPs. Scrubbing, therefore, necessarily must have the ability to detect
application-layer attacks and discern them from normal traffic (even if that normal traffic is just
higher volume than usual). Some commercial solutions for on-premises mitigation appliances are
Netscout’s Arbor, Radware, and A10 Networks [1, 35, 41].
Traffic sources (either remote networks or specific remote hosts) might be sending both proper
application traffic and DDoS traffic. For example, a single large home-access network (under a
single routed BGP prefix) might have well-functioning hosts transacting with a website, and sepa-
rate compromised hosts (bots) sending DDoS traffic (possibly some hosts sending both attack and
non-attack traffic).
This can make remediation difficult; for example, is a UDP packet a legitimate DNS query, or a
legitimate NTP query, or is it a SYN packet that is actually trying to setup a TCP connection, or
a legitimate TLS 1.3 0-RTT resumption? In these types of situations, it can be very hard to sep-
arate attack traffic from non-attack traffic, solely at the network/transport layers. Some attacks
require multiple round trips with a source to distinguish, and defenders are often very adverse to
dropping legitimate traffic (false positives). In order to discern attack traffic from non-attack traf-
fic, especially as TTPs continue to become more complex, remediation often occurs by assessing
application-level semantics of traffic. This is precisely the remit of “scrubbing” appliances. Their
job is to “scrub” attacks out of, and forward on only, legitimate traffic.
This unavoidable complexity is precisely why scrubbing is the industry’s last line of defense.
While approaches like FlowSpec, RTBH, and the IETF’s new working group on DDoS Open Threat
Signaling (dots) [33] are all attempting to enhance the network/transport layer to aid in DDoS
defense, scrubbing centers catch all DDoS attacks that get through.3
Because discerning the difference between a traffic burst and an attack can be difficult (and
time is often of the essence), some Internet services engage an “always-on” mitigation provider
(sending all traffic through mitigation machinery, even during peace-time), so that detection and
mitigation can both be handled together, with high confidence and low latency.
4.2 State of the art: scrubbing centers
Whether scrubbing appliances are deployed deeply in carrier networks’ cores, or in service providers
that draw traffic in, they represent a relatively centralized solution to DDoS’ distributed threat.
3And, as of this writing, most DDoS attacks are mitigated in this way.
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Sites that have a lot of bandwidth and specialized hardware and/or software are called scrub-
bing centers, and some companies offer these as a commercial service (Mitigation as a Service,
MaaS) [4, 14, 36]. While mitigation appliances are sold to SPs, and can be deployed in any network
for self-protection, mitigation providers quantifiably offer more utility than trying to detect and
remediate DDoS on one’s own. Mitigation providers will have already invested in large transit
and peering capacities (often in excess of 1 Tbps, in aggregate), will have deployed their infras-
tructure across the Internet at topologically diverse locations, likely have augmented mitigation
appliances’ technology with custom enhancements, will have 24/7 Security Operations Centers
(SOCs) monitoring traffic, and likely also have in house (or retained the services of) cybersecu-
rity threat intelligence teams. While paying for protection may seem like a jagged pill to swallow,
MaaS providers are arguably our most advanced line of defense. In short, the threats are such that
is pays to pay for protection. For example, one of the benefits to this approach is it helps to in-
strument attacks in way that sometimes allows defenders (information security teams, incident
response teams, etc.) to create profiles that can attribute attacks to specific “families” of malcode,
and occasionally even attribute attacks to the actor(s) responsible. This is especially evident when
one considers that large mitigation providers see a broader cross-section of attack traffic, and this
enables deeper analysis. Of course, is that a benefit of MaaS providers’ positions, or an indica-
tion that our defenses are in need of basic research to overcome the inherent asymmetry between
attackers and victims?
5 SEARCHING FOR REMEDIATION
Fundamentals of the problem In the last 20 years of fighting DDoS, we have learned a lot,
and a lot of insightful systems have been built to counter DDoS attacks. However, we have not
fundamentally advanced our protections. In that time, we have greatly increased the bandwidth
of our networks, but that has also benefited our attackers. It has actually benefited them more
because for every remediation instance that has more bandwidth (e.g. scrubbing centers, Inter-
net service instances, redundant sites, etc.), so too does every attacking bot (of which there are
more). In addition, Moore’s Law has also brought more abundant, cheap, powerful, and (unfortu-
nately) compromisable end devices on to the Internet at a rate that meets (and often outpaces) our
remediation infrastructure. Even scrubbing centers cannot expect to keep up with the growing
edge-capacity of increasingly well provisioned compromised hosts (bots). This is what frames the
asymmetry and ultimate impedance mismatch of DDoS: there are large numbers of attack sources
that can arbitrarily send attack traffic, and which are being triaged by central remediation infras-
tructures. What’s more, attack sources are (almost by necessity) far fromwhere we remediate their
aggregate attacks. This leads to congested transit-links, which in turn leads to unobserved (and
unobservable) disruption in the network, as attack traffic accumulates on its way to victims.
What would help: With the many types of DDoS, the multiple TTPs, the diverse topologies of
routed infrastructure, and more, it is easy to classify the problem-space as problematically complex.
We argue that now is a critical time to embrace a principled approach to identifying the architec-
tural features that have made DDoS attacks so relatively easy to launch. We believe that what is
needed are investigations into what fundamentals enable and exacerbate DDoS. A foundational
understanding of this would jumpstart determining what protections are needed, the possibility
(or not) for incrementally deployable solutions, and what operational plans can be effective. One
core observation is that combating the distributed nature of DDoS from relatively centralized van-
tage points misaligns many core aspects of the nature of DDoS, and enabling remediations at the
edge (where attacking nodes reside) seems to be an insightful start at addressing one fundamental
aspect of the overall problem. Approaches along these lines seem to have the potential to begin
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effectively addressing the scaling problems of volumetric attacks. However, given that attacks cap-
italize on application-level semantics, operationally viable solutions which can be effectuated in
the network require providing the network layer with information about application semantics –
a requirement which conflicts with today’s TCP/IP layered stack.
Existing Approaches: In considering how to push remediations into the network, there are
some operational and standardized approaches being attempted now. As discussed in Section 2,
FlowSpec, RTBH, and dots all attempt flavors of pushing semantics into the network to try and
bolster a distributed defense. Between operational overheads, coarseness of the remediation, col-
lateral damage, and (in the case of dots) still nascent investigations these approaches have at best
been triage for our DDoS battlefield damage. In addition to these, to address source address spoof-
ing, two Best Common Practices (BCPs) exist to inform network operators how to configure their
networks to no allow out-bound, or in-bound, spoofed packets [8, 19]. While a great deal of atten-
tion has been paid to getting these deployed, there has been relatively little successful effect (as
evidenced by the scale of recent reflector attacks [5, 25, 30]). A principled inspection of this might
suggest that the reason for limited deployment stems from the misalignment of costs and benefits.
That is, since the costs of deploying are not aligned with incentives (i.e. those DDoS victims who
benefit from deployment are not the network providers who have to deploy and pay if there is a
misconfiguration). Indeed, this has been noted in operational communities as well, “The costs . . .
not directly [being] borne by the potential beneficiaries of deploying the solution” [22].
An interesting question is, since source-address spoofing is related to the inter-domain routing
system, should it be mitigated by security protections at that layer? Today, inter-domain routing
security is being addressed by a relatively new set of standards called the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [28]. However, this approach (and its dependent technologies) do not address
the data-plane, and focus only on IP address allocation and potentially some aspects of BGP’s
control-plane (which has no relationship to source-address spoofing).
Without a fundamental/principled approach, attack vectors require case-by-case remediation
techniques at the application-level. What this means is that after each application is discovered to
have a DDoS attack vector, it and its maintainers must retread an increasingly common path taken
by exploited applications: they must create remediation and detection techniques, then undergo
the process of promoting operational deployment of protections, and then sometimes promote
associated network configuration changes. Examples of applications fending for themselves are
DNS’ Response Rate Limiting (RRL) [44], the advice to disable NTP’s monlist command [9], etc.
Mature proposals from the research literature, such as the TrafficValidation Architecture (TVA) [45]
and Pushback [24], have existed for some time. Approaches like these aim to offer distributed re-
mediations by using in-network deployment. Yet, years after publication, they have not gained
deployment traction. As with BCP-38 and BCP-84, incentives are not aligned with those paying
costs for deployment. A more recent proposal, Stellar [18], embraces many of the approaches in
FlowSpec, RTBH, and dots by proposing a new black-holing framework. It also attempts to better
align costs with benefits by focusing on deployments in large IXPs, and in doing so also aims to
reduce black-holing’s collateral damage by pushing remediations closer to the attacking sources.
Other recent work called FITT [47] has begun investigating if today’s Internet architecture itself
is in need to reevaluation. This work proposes using Named Data Networking (NDN) [2, 46] as an
incrementally deployable solution whose incentive model is designed to align costs with benefits,
to (among other things) combat the DDoS threat.
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6 DISCUSSION
Have we made fundamental enhancements to our DDoS defenses in the last 20 years? The land-
scape of cheap, compromisable, bots has only become more fertile to miscreants, and more damag-
ing to Internet service operators. Increases in bandwidth have been shared by Internet services and
attacking bots, but have been multiplied by a asymmetric scaling factor for compromised nodes
(there’s just more of them). Our applications have becomemore complex and even our security and
privacy protections (like TLS, HTTPS, etc.) have made DDoS harder to mitigate in the network.We
need a principled approach to this problem, basic research on ways to bridge an asymmetric gap,
incentive models that align costs with benefits, and novel insights that today’s operators can use.
As a starting point for discussions, we posit that using the network to mount a distributed defense
is the right basic approach, and those defense technologies that undercut the network properties
that DDoS is built on, and reward early adopters (economically, qualitatively, or in other palpable
ways) are going to be key to changing the tide of our war on DDoS. However, with trends like TTPs
increasingly moving to the application-level and the near ubiquity of end-to-end encryption, can
we expect the network and transport layer semantics to be expressive enough to combat DDoS by
themselves? This is a call to action: the research community is our best hope and best qualified to
take up this call.
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